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government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will
not affect the marginal income tax structure. In the absence of a direct tax instrument,
the appearance of outsourcing, under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing
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1. Introduction
During the latest 10-15 years, outsourcing has become an increasingly important
business practice. Outsourcing is meant to imply that part of the production activity is
located to another country. The large wage differences across countries is most likely
an important explanation for this behavior, as the production costs may be
substantially reduced if part of the production is located to a country with lower
wages1. Although earlier research has addressed the implications of outsourcing for
unemployment and welfare policy2, there are (to our knowledge) no earlier studies
dealing with how the appearance of outsourcing may modify the optimal use of
redistributive nonlinear income taxation.
The purpose of this short paper is to incorporate outsourcing into the two-type
optimal income tax model developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). We show
that if the government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, then
outsourcing will not modify the policy rules for the marginal income tax rates. Instead,
the government will use a positive tax on outsourcing, which contributes to reduce the
wage inequality and, therefore, also to relax the self-selection constraint. On the other
hand, if the government is not able to directly tax outsourcing, it will modify from
social welfare point of view its use of income taxation accordingly. In this case, and
under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing  increases wage differentials,
our results show that outsourcing provides an incentive for the government to
implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher
marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done.
In Section 2, we present the model, whereas the optimal use of income taxation
is discussed in Section 3. Finally, we present a brief summary in Section 4.
1 See e.g. Amiti and Wei (2004), Rishi and Saxena (2004) and Sinn (2007).
2 See e.g. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2007).
22. The Model
We consider a model with two-ability types; a low-ability type (denoted by index 1)
and a high-ability type (denoted by index 2). This distinction refers to productivity,
which is interpreted to mean that the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage
rate than the low-ability type. As the number of individuals of each ability-type is not
important here, it will be normalized to one for notational convenience. The utility
function facing ability-type i is written as
( , )i i iu u c z? (1)
where c is consumption and z leisure. Leisure is, in turn, defined as a time endowment,
H, less the time spent in market work, l. The individual budget constraint is written as
( ) 0i i i i iw l T w l c? ? ? (2)
in which w is the hourly gross wage rate and )( iilwT  the income tax payment. The
first order condition for the hours of work becomes
(1 '( )) 0i i i i ic zu w T w l u? ? ? (3)
where '( ) ( ) / ( )i i i i i iT w l T w l w l? ? ?  is the marginal income tax rate.
Turning to the production side of the economy, the representative firm uses three
variable inputs, labor of each ability-type and the amount of resources outsourced to
production abroad. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the technology is
characterized by constant returns to scale. Following Koskela and Stenbacka (2007),
the production function is written as 1 2( , , )f l l M , where M represents the resources
spent on outsourcing, where outsourcing is assumed to be substitutable for unskilled
labor and complementary with skilled labor. This assumption implies
1
1 2( , , ) 0
l M
f l l M ?  and 2 1 2( , , ) 0l Mf l l M ? . There is also a cost associated with
3outsourcing, ( )M? , which is increasing and strictly convex. The first order conditions
for the firm become
1
1 2 1( , , ) 0lf l l M w? ? (4)
2
1 2 2( , , ) 0lf l l M w? ? (5)
1 2( , , ) ( ) 0M Mf l l M M t?? ? ? (6)
where t is a tax attached to outsourcing. This policy instrument may either be
operative or not in the analysis we present in Section 3.
3. Optimal Nonlinear Taxation
We analyze Pareto efficient taxation, which means maximizing the utility of one of the
ability-types subject to minimum utility restrictions for the other. Suppose that the
government behaves as if it maximizes the utility of the low-ability type subject to
minimum utility restrictions for the high-ability type. The minimum utility restriction
is given by
2 2 2 2( , )u u c z u? ? (7)
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government knows the income of
each individual as well as the number of individuals of each agent-type, whereas
ability is private information. The latter means that the government would not be able
to observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or high-ability type. By
concentrating on the 'normal' case, where redistribution means income transfers from
the high-ability to the low-ability type, one would like to prevent the high-ability type
from pretending to be a low-ability type, i.e. prevent the high-ability type from
becoming a mimicker, in order to gain from the redistribution. The self-selection
constraint that may bind then becomes
2 2 2 1 1 2ˆ( , ) ( , )u u c z u c H l u?? ? ? ? (8)
4where 2uˆ  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 1 2/w w? ?  the wage ratio, i.e. the
relative wage rate. By using the first order conditions for the firm, one can see that ?
is a function of 1l , 2l  and M , i.e. 1 2( , , )l l M? ?? , where / 0M?? ? ? . Note that the
mimicker faces the same income and consumption point (and, therefore, pays as much
tax as) the low-ability type; however, as the mimicker is more productive than the
low-ability type, he/she spends more time on leisure.
The budget constraint of the government is given by
( ) 0i i
i
T w l tM? ?? (9)
Note that ( )T ?  is a general income tax in the sense that it may be used to implement
any desired combination of 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c . It is, therefore, convenient to follow
earlier comparable literature by using 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c , instead of the parameters of
( )T ? , as direct decision-variables. Similarly, since control over 1l , 1c , 2l , and 2c  also
means that the government can use t  to exercise perfect control over M , we may also
use M  as a direct decision-variable in what follows. By using the private budget
constraint and the zero profit condition, we may rewrite the budget constraint of the
government to read
1 2( , , ) ( ) 0i
i
f l l M c M?? ? ?? (10)
The Lagrangean is given by
1 2 2 2 1 2ˆ[ ] [ ( , , ) ( )]i
i
L u u u u f l l M c M? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? (11)
The first order conditions in terms of hours of work, consumption and outsourcing are
given by
1 2 1 1
1ˆ 0z zu u l wl
?? ? ??? ?? ? ? ? ?? ??? ?
(12)
51 2ˆ 0c cu u? ?? ? ? (13)
2 2 1 2
2ˆ( ) 0z zu u l wl
?? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ?
?
(14)
2( ) 0cu? ? ?? ? ? (15)
2 1ˆ [ ( ) ( )] 0z M Mu l f MM
?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
?
(16)
We are now in the position to analyze the question: how does the appearance of
outsourcing affect the optimal tax structure? The marginal income tax rate of the low-
ability type might be derived by combining equations (3), (12) and (13), whereas the
marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type is derived by combining equations
(3), (14) and (15). Finally, the tax rate on outsourcing can be derived by combining
equations (6) and (16). Let
,
i
i z
z c i
c
uMRS
u
?  and
2
2
, 2
ˆˆ
ˆ
z
z c
c
uMRS
u
be the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption for
ability-type i and the mimicker, respectively. We can derive
*
' 1 1 1 2 2 1
, ,1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]z c z c zT w l MRS MRS u lw w l
? ? ??
?
?
? ? ?
?
(17)
' 2 2 2 1
2 2ˆ( ) zT w l u lw l
? ?
?
?? ?
?
(18)
2 1
zˆt u l M
? ?
?
?? ?
?
(19)
where * 2ˆ /cu? ? ?? . The marginal income tax rates are the same as those derived by
Stiglitz (1982). Therefore, one would normally expect that ' 1 1( ) 0T w l ?  and
' 2 2( ) 0T w l ? . As the intuition behind the use of marginal income taxation is well
understood from earlier research, it will not be further discussed here.
6Note that the government may also relax the self-selection constraint via the tax
on outsourcing. With the assumptions made above, we have3 / 0M?? ? ? , which
means that the optimal tax on outsourcing is positive. The intuition is that the tax on
outsourcing reduces the amount of resources subject to outsourcing which, in turn,
increases the wage ratio. This makes mimicking less attractive and contributes to relax
the self-selection constraint. As such, the tax on outsourcing creates additional room
for redistribution. In addition, since the government is able to directly control
outsourcing, there is no need to modify the policy rules for marginal income taxation.
We can summarize our finding as follows;
Proposition 1. If the government is able to directly tax outsourcing, the tax
on outsourcing will be positive at the second best optimum. In this case, the
appearance of outsourcing will not modify the policy rules for the marginal
income tax rates.
The next question is: what happens if the tax instrument on outsourcing, for some
reason, is not operative? In this case, the government is not able to directly control the
outsourcing via taxation, meaning that it may have an incentive to modify its use of
income taxation accordingly. Let
2 1
zˆ M Mu l fM
?? ??? ? ? ?
?
denote the marginal welfare effect of outsourcing. Furthermore, by using equation (6),
we can derive 1 2( , )M M l l? . We have the following expressions for the marginal
income tax rates;
*
' 1 1 1 2 2 1
, ,1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]z c z c z
MT w l MRS MRS u l
w w l w l
? ? ??
? ?
?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ??????
(20)
3 Empirical support for the idea that outsourcing leads to more inequality are provided e.g. by Feenstra
and Hanson (1999), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Hijzen (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008).
7' 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2ˆ( ) z
MT w l u l
w l w l
? ?
? ?
?
? ? ?? ? ?
? ??????
(21)
By comparison with equations (17) and (18), equations (20) and (21) also reflect an
additional policy incentive created by the appearance of outsourcing, which is
summarized by the final part on the right hand side of each marginal income tax rate
expression. The intuition is that the government is no longer able to control
outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, in which case it will modify its use of income
taxation. Note from equation (6) that 0M Mf ?? ? , which means that 0? ? . In
addition, by using equation (6), one can show that 1/ 0M l? ? ?  and 2/ 0M l? ? ? .
Therefore, with the assumptions made above, we have derived the following result.
Proposition 2. If the government is not able to control the outsourcing via a
direct tax instrument, then the appearance of outsourcing will contribute to
decrease the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type and increase
the marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that by increasing the hours of work supplied by
the low-ability type and decreasing the hours of work supplied by the high-ability
type, we may reduce the amount of resources that are subject to outsourcing. The latter
contributes to relax the self-selection constraint, which creates further room for
redistribution.
4. Summary
This paper analyzes the implications of outsourcing for optimal income taxation by
using the two-type optimal income tax model. Our results show that if the government
is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not affect
the policy rules for the marginal income tax rates. Instead, the government uses a
positive tax on outsourcing, which contributes to reduce the wage inequality and,
therefore, also to relax the self-selection constraint. In the absence of a direct tax
instrument, on the other hand, the appearance of outsourcing means that the
8government implements a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and
a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise
have done.
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